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Abstract—Direct Mobile-to-Mobile communication mode 
known also as Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is 
expected to be supported in the 5G mobile system. D2D 
communication aims to improve system spectrum efficiency, 
overall system throughput, energy efficiency and reduce the 
connection delay between devices. However, new security 
threats and challenges need to be considered regarding device 
and user authentication to avoid unauthorized access, abuse and 
attacks on the whole system. In this paper, a strong standalone 
authentication technique therefore is proposed. It is based on 
combining users’ biometric identities and a new clone-resistant 
device identity. The novel property of the proposal is that it is 
fully independent on both device manufacturer and mobile 
system operator. The biometric identity deploys user’s 
keystroke dynamics and accelerometer to generate user’s 
biometric identity by deploying a machine learning technique. 
The proposed mobile device clone-resistant identity is based on 
deploying a new concept of a pure digital clone-resistant 
structure which is both manufacturer and mobile operator 
independent. When combining both identities, a mutually 
authenticated D2D secured link between any two devices can be 
established in addition to a strong user-device authentication.  
Furthermore, the concept does not allow the managing trusted 
authority to intercept users’ private links. Being an independent 
and standalone system, the technique would offer a broad 
spectrum of attractive future smart applications over the 5G 
mobile system infrastructure. 
Keywords— 5G security, Mobile user authentication, D2D 
authentication, clone-resistant functions, Secret Unknown 
Cipher, Biometrics, keystroke dynamics, machine learning 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The traffic capacity requirements on future broadband 
mobile system is expected to grow over the coming years. An 
increasing demand on streaming videos, gaming, and social 
media traffic is expected. The fourth generation (4G) Network 
will not be able to emerge efficiently. Therefore, a new 
generation of broadband mobile system is required to link the 
wireless technologies at higher speed. The fifth generation 
system (5G) [1] [2] is expected to be able to cope with all 
growing services by supporting smaller cells. 5G is expected 
to support device to device (D2D) connectivity where devices 
may communicate with each other directly. D2D links are 
offering extra link-capacities on which devices may 
communicate directly without the interaction of the access 
points or base stations. In this case, the base station offloads 
the traffic from the core network to reduce the energy and 
cost per bit. This paradigm is a further support for services 
such as social media traffic [2][3]. Application of D2D in 5G 
networks supports firstly local services which include 
proximity services such as social applications and local 
advertising. Secondly, supports emergency communication; 
when natural disasters happen and the traditional 
communication networks fails, D2D solves such emergency 
issues. Finally, D2D allows IoT enhancement, a typical 
application is vehicle to vehicle communication [4][5][6]. 
D2D authentication represents a fundamental problem 
which need to be resolved. Moreover, user-to-device 
authentication is another essential requirement to ensure the 
complete authentication chain in the proposed security 
system architecture. User-to-device authentication allows 
only a genuine device user to communicate with another user 
that is also authenticated by its device. D2D authentication 
should cover joint authentication of both devices and their 
corresponding users. Hence, secure user-to-user 
communication is attained by fulfilling jointly both D2D 
authentication and user-to-device authentication. In this 
paper, user’s behavior when operating his/her device is 
deployed to prove his/her identity together with the used 
device by applying a machine learning (ML) model generated 
and managed by a trusted authority. It is also proposed that 
each device assures its unique digital clone-resistant identity 
based on embedding a Secret Unknown Ciphers (SUC) in the 
device as device identity.  
Contribution. A new technology of SUCs as digital 
functions is proposed to be embedded as a clone-resistant 
device identity as security anchors for smart mobile devices. 
A machine learning model deploying user biometric 
keystroke and accelerometer dynamics as features is 
proposed to identify users. A strong authentication protocol 
between devices using both identities jointly is proposed to 
secure D2D links. The protocol is operator and manufacturer 
independent and may be operated by any group’s trusted 
authority. The extracted biometric user identity resulted with 
96% accuracy in biometric key generation. The overall joint 
device-SUC clone-resistant electronic identity together with 
the biometric key results with a highly-robust, trustable and 
operator independent secured communication protocols. 
Security analysis shows that the resulting system is highly 
scalable, secure and resilient. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section II 
describes the state of the art of unclonable units, biometric 
identification and 5G network. Section III describes a user-
to-device and device-to-device security system architecture. 
The proposed devices and users’ identifications mechanisms 
with the biometric key experimental results are described in 
section IV. Section V describes the security protocol allowing 
user-to-device and D2D authentication with the related 
security analysis. Section VI concludes the research results. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Mobile devices have become powerful people-centric 
sensing devices due to many embedded sensors such as GPS, 
Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, accelerometer, etc. Hence, they can be used 
to collect a variety of information about their environments 
and the behavior of their owners. This allows to explore many 
additional uses such as identification and recommendation 
system. In [7], a behavioral model is presented to discover 
human behavior by collecting personal data of 37 users for 2 
months. The resulting user identification model achieved up 
to more than 80% accuracy, but for other cases less than 30% 
accuracy. In [8], a fingerprint framework was developed, 
which can identify a user by using heterogeneous data sensors. 
The resulting user identification model achieved accuracy of 
94.68% for 4 users, 93.14% for 10 users and 81.30% for 22 
users. However, many challenging practical issues underlying 
the previous methods still open such as biometric data 
collection framework, data analysis classification, and 
identification accuracy. 
5G mobile system is expected to support D2D 
communication. For this purpose, strong D2D authentication 
mechanism would be needed.  We believe that one of the 
major security requirements is to create unclonable devices 
which protect them against physical and mathematical cloning 
attacks and allow D2D authentication. Physical Unclonable 
Functions (PUFs) [9], [10] were increasingly proposed as 
central identity building blocks in cryptographic protocols and 
security architectures. PUFs are mainly deployed to serve for 
secure devices identification and authentication, memoryless 
key storage and intellectual property protection. However, 
PUFs responses are inherently noisy and contain a limited 
amount of entropy because of aging factors and their 
sensitivity to the operating conditions such as temperature and 
supply voltage variations. To remedy this problem, fuzzy 
extractors or helper data algorithms were proposed to stabilize 
PUF’s operation. However, such error-correction mechanisms 
are costly, complex and require high gate count resources [9], 
[10]. Moreover, many PUFs are susceptible to modeling 
attacks. To overcome PUFs drawbacks, SUC was proposed as 
clone-resistant digital electronic physical structures [11]–[14]. 
In this paper, each device is supposed to embed its unique 
SUC by its user. SUC can be personalized by a trusted 
authority by storing a set of challenge response pairs for each 
unit and used later for clone-resistant identification. In [4], 
SUC is proposed for special use to be embedded in vehicular 
electronic control units; a variety of automotive security 
applications were developed based on SUCs such as secure in-
vehicle network, secure and private vehicle-to-vehicle and 
vehicle-to-roadside communications and secure over-the-air 
software update. In [13], even a new concept for SUC-based 
secured e-coins circulations was also proposed.  
III. TARGETED D2D SECURITY SYSTEM OPERATION 
This section presents the system security architecture with 
the required operations for the targeted authentication 
mechanisms. Fig. 1 describes the proposed user-to-device 
and D2D network architecture. The relevant participating 
entities in the security system operation are identified as 
follows: 
Device-User clone-resistant
Biometric identity
Trusted Authority 
as “pure mediator”
Unclonable electronic devices identities
Secure communication link between A and B
User B User A
Convey one
time ticket of A
Convey one
time ticket of B
 
Fig.  1. Operation scenario of the  D2D secured link 
• Mobile Device: Each device (Mobile) embeds its 
unique clone-resistant unit SUC that allows both 
devices to build a secure communication link by means 
of a limited intervention of the trusted authority. 
• Users: Each user possessing a mobile can prove its 
identity by means of its behavior which is acquired by 
its mobile and then transferred to the trusted authority 
to generate the user-classification model during the 
training phase. The classification model is used by the 
TA to identify users from their behavior profiles 
during the operation.  
• Trusted Authority: TA is an agreed-on authority that 
securely manages the Challenge Response Pair (CRP) 
records of all SUCs for device identification. 
Moreover, TA is responsible for running machine 
learning algorithms (MLA) to build users 
classifications model based on some users-mobile 
features. The trusted authority may be independent on 
mobile manufacturers and operators. 
The communication process proceeds as follows: user A 
requests TA asking to communicate with user B. A one-time 
identification ticket from SUCA’s records is used to secure 
this request. TA then verifies if user A’s biometric identity 
corresponds to A’s mobile identity based on its device’s 
SUCA. If this happens to be true, the request is then forwarded 
to user B’s mobile secured by another one-time ticket from 
SUCB’s records.  The verification of the correspondence of 
user B’ biometric identity to B’s mobile device identity SUCB 
is also done by the TA. Finally, and if all identities match, 
both mobiles can communicate directly without the 
interference of the TA. TA plays a pure mediator role and 
cannot eavesdrop the D2D link. The resulting D2D mutual 
VPN-link is based jointly on combining user’s biometric 
identities with the clone-resistant identities of their own 
mobiles (SUCA and SUCB) as illustrated in Fig. 1. 
IV. ESTABLISHING JOINT USER-TO-DEVICE AND D2D 
UNCLONABLE LINKS 
In this section, the proposed methods to provide mobiles 
and users with the necessary physical clone-resistant identities 
are presented. SUC is embedded as a clone-resistant unit 
within all mobile devices. It should provide a unique and 
unpredictable identity to each mobile device. Moreover, a ML 
model for mobile user identification is developed through 
building a ML model that is deploying some users features 
when using their mobiles such as the speed of typing and 
user’s movement when writing a given text. 
A. SUC-based  Clone-Resistant Device Identity  
As Secret Unknown Cipher (SUC) is not well known in 
the public literature, the concept is repeatedly described in this 
section. SUC is a randomly and internally self-generated 
unknown and unpredictable cipher. It resides in the main 
mobile chip, where users, manufacturers or operators have no 
access or influence on its creation process. Each generated 
SUC can be defined as an invertible, however unknown 
Pseudo Random Function (PRF); as follows: 
{ } { }: 0,1 0,1→
⎯⎯⎯→
n m
PRF
SUC
X Y
                           (1) 
And its decryption mode: 
{ } { }
1
1 : 0,1 0,1
−
− →
⎯⎯⎯→
m n
PRF
SUC
Y X
                           (2) 
In this paper, we assume that the SUC is based on a block 
cipher design. For optimum cost and performance, an 
involution (self-inverting) SUC design is used. That is 
SUC=SUC-1 holds and hence: 
{ } { }
{ }
: 0,1 0,1
where ( ( )) for all 0,1
→
= ∈
n n
n
SUC
SUC SUC X X X
     
 
(3) 
Involution SUCs are easier to implement in practice 
compared to non-involution SUCs. Furthermore, SUC 
structures would have less hardware/software complexity 
resulting with low overhead in the mobile-device physical 
clone-resistant structures. 
Fig. 2 describes the concept for embedding SUCs in future 
System on Chip (SoC) units (in mobile devices). The 
personalization process proceeds as follows: (1) A Trusted 
Authority (TA) injects a software package called “GENIE” 
which is capable to internally-create unpredictable and 
unknown random ciphers. (2) The GENIE is triggered to 
create the SUC in a single event as a permanent structure (for 
example in a non-volatile FPGA fabric). Unpredictability is 
attained by using the internal unpredictable True Random 
Number Generator (TRNG) sequence in that process.  (3) 
When the GENIE completes the creation of the SUC, it will 
be fully deleted and the SoC unit ends up with its unique, non-
removable and unpredictable cipher structure called SUCA.  
(4) For personalization, TA challenges unit A, that is SUCA by 
a set of t-plaintexts AiX  and gets the corresponding 
ciphertexts ( )=Ai A AiY SUC X  to store them securely in  the  
“Units Individual Records” (UIR) as a Challenge Response 
Pairs (CRP) list labeled by the device’s serial number SNA. 
CRP list entries are to be used later by the TA as “one-time 
tickets” to authenticate devices. 
GENIE
Trusted Authority
Created Secret
Cipher known
only to the chip
1
2
Upload a Smart  Cipher  Creator 
“GENIE”  (Software package)
3
TRNG
GENIE
TRNG
TRNG
SNA
XA0 Y10
… …
XAi Y1i
… …
XA(t-1) Y1(t-1)
XAi
YAi
4
SoC FPGA SNA 
(embedded in a mobile 
device)
Secured “Units Individual Records”
(UIR) (to be kept secret)
SNn
Xn0 Yn0
… …
Xni Yni
… …
Xn(t-1) Yn(t-1)
SUCA
SUCA
Fig.  2.  The concept of creating SUCs in SoC FPGA devices  
Many SUC designs were recently proposed. In [12], Mars et 
al. propose a digital clone-resistant function prototype based 
on Random Stream Cipher (RSC) deploying T-Functions with 
random parameters as building block. In [14], Mars et al. 
propose a new family of stream ciphers based on combining 
randomly selected nonlinear feedback shift registers. 
B. Biometric key Generation 
The current section presents the approach used to generate 
users’ biometric keys. It exploits the proved unique behavior 
of users, such as, the movement of the user's hand when 
he/she writes a message as well as his/her typing speed to 
recall the biometric key. The combination of the 
aforementioned biometrics would form the user’ profile.  
Fig. 3 describes the used methodology to build a machine 
learning model (M) based on users’ patterns. Each 
smartphone acquires its user’s patterns set and sends it to a, 
trusted authority. The trusted authority runs a machine 
learning algorithm (MLA) based on the training data (users’ 
patterns) and generate a model M. 
MLA
Generate 
a Model M
Trusted Authority
ASUC
BSUC
BPattern
APattern
 
Fig.  3. Building a machine learning model M 
Algorithm 1 describes the pseudo-code of the proposed 
approach. As input, the algorithm has #R number of readings 
, , ,i i i ix y z s  where , ,i i ix y z  are the coordinates from the 
accelerometer in the three-dimensional space and is denotes 
the typing speed. Each reading corresponds to a different user 
defined by IDi. The algorithm tries to generate the best model 
by entering the readings to all classifiers that generate the 
corresponding model Mj. The output of the algorithm is the 
model M which has the best accuracy. Our approach 
implements the most common classifiers, these are: K-
nearest neighbor, support vector machine, decision tree, 
naive Bayes and logistic regression. 
 
Algorithm 1:  User Biometric key detection 
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1) Data specification 
The used dataset is collected from 30 experiments. In each 
experiment, a new user writes a text message and the system 
records the acceleration on , ,x y z space coordinates as well 
as the time that the user needs to write the same message. Each 
user repeated the experiment several times. 
2) Extracting dynamic biometric key 
For training and testing tasks, the data are divided into two 
parts. Once or while the smartphone sends a data to the server, 
the classifiers train the received data and produce a model of 
dynamic biometric key, which is a set of probabilistic, 
deterministic, or tree based dynamic roles. The dynamicity of 
the dataset changes the roles of the model frequently, which 
leads to build dynamic model. Accessing smartphone is 
restricted due to energy issue; therefore, the smartphone 
transmits the data of accelerometer and the typing speed to a 
server for further processing. 
3) Classification model  
Fig. 4 describes an example of the extracted decision tree 
model. For each user, a specific threshold for each feature is 
automatically computed. _X Threshold , _Y Threshold , 
_Z Threshold  and _S Threshold  denote threshold vectors 
for all users correspondingly for , ,x y z  coordinates and the 
speed of typing s. The thresholds are used for classifying the 
data into classes. To classify, if one or more of the roles is met, 
then user is genuine; otherwise; user is fake.  
≤ _Z Z Threshold
≤ _Y Y Threshold
≤ _X X Threshold
≤ _S S Threshold Genuine User
Fake User
YesYes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
 
Fig.  4. Classification model M 
The performance of the used MLAs is compared regarding 
their accuracy and Mathew Correlation Coefficient (MCC) 
metrics. The accuracy is defined as ratio of correctly 
classified cases to the total number of cases. The MCC is the 
estimator of the correlation between the classified results and 
the actual results. Fig. 5 presents the obtained results for 
different algorithms. 30 persons were tested, the average 
accuracy was 88%; the highest accuracy attained was 96% in 
favor of naïve Bayes classifier. The average accuracy for a 
set of only 10 users was 88%, 87% for a set of 20 users and 
88% for a set of 30 users. The results showed that the 
accuracy improves by higher users count. 
 
Fig.  5. Classification results 
V. JOINT USER-DEVICE AND D2D AUTHENTICATION  
A. User-to-Device and D2D Authentication 
Fig. 6 describes a possible D2D authentication protocol 
allowing both devices with their authentic users to generate a 
shared key that no other third party can disclose. The 
following authentication protocol is a possible 
implementation scenario partially based on the generic SUC 
identification protocol described in [11].  The protocol 
proceeds as follows:  
• Step 1: Mobile B starts the authentication request by 
sending its own serial number SNB together with the 
open number of the requested mobile A having the 
serial number SNA to the TA 
• Step 2: TA checks if both serial numbers do exist in 
TA’s UIR. If not, the request is rejected and aborted. 
Otherwise, TA picks randomly a pair /Bl BlX Y , and 
generates a random nonce RT1, then computes 
1( , , )=TB B T BlH H SN R X , where H is a public hash 
function.  TA then returns TBH  concatenated with 
1TR  and  BlY to the mobile B (SNB) 
• Step 3: Mobile B uses its SUCB to reproduce the 
corresponding 1 ( )−=Bl B BlX SUC Y  and checks whether 
1( , , )=TB B T BlH H SN R X . If not, the request is rejected 
and aborted. Otherwise, TA generates a random nonce 
RB1 and sends 1 1( || ) ||Bl
tB
X B B BE xyzs R R to TA. Notice 
that only the TA and mobile B know the encryption 
key BlX . 
• Step 4: TA decrypts the received message as 
' 1
1 1|| ( ( || ))B BBl Bl
t t
B B X X B Bxyzs R E E xyzsS R
−
= . Then, it 
checks if ' 1 1=B BR R  and ( )B
t
B BM xyzs SUC↔ . If it is 
matching, TA accepts and continues otherwise it 
rejects and aborts. M is the selected classification 
model according to the algorithm in section IV. B. It 
takes as input the features BtBxyzs denoting the 
coordinates in the three-dimensional space (xyz) and 
the speed of typing (s) of user B at time tB. The TA 
picks randomly a new SUCB pair XAk/YAk, and generates 
a random nonce RT2, then computes 
2( , , )=TA A T AkH H SN R X  and sends TAH  
concatenated with RT2, YAk and SNB to mobile A as 
, , ,TA A Ak BH R Y SN .  
• Step 5: Mobile A uses its SUCA to reproduce the 
corresponding 1( )−=Ak A AkX SUC Y  and checks if  
2( , , )=TA A T AkH H SN R X . If not true, mobile A rejects 
and aborts. Otherwise, it generates a random nonce RA1 
and sends 1 1( || ) ||AAk
t
X A A AE xyzs R R  to TA. By 
receiving SNB, mobile A knows that it is going to 
communicate with mobile B (with user B).  
• Step 6: TA decrypts the received message as 
' 1
1 1|| ( ( || ))A AAk Ak
t t
A A X X A Axyzs R E E xyzs R
−
= . Then checks 
if ' 1 1=A AR R and ( )A
t
A AM xyzs SUC↔ (M generates a 
biometric key allowing the TA to verify the identity of 
user B). If it matches, TA sends ( / )
BlX Aj Aj
E X Y  to 
mobile B and ( / )
AkX Bi Bi
E X Y  to mobile A. Otherwise, 
it rejects. The TA deletes the used pairs: 
, and ,Aj Aj Bi BiX Y X Y . 
• Step 7: a public key ad-hoc VPN link is built between 
users A and B. This would prohibit any later 
interception by the TA. 
• Step 8: Device A decrypts the received encrypted pair 
as 1/ ( ( / ))
Ak AkBi Bi X X Bi Bi
X Y E E X Y−=   and generates a 
random value RA2. Then, challenges device B with the 
received YBi  by sending 2 ,B A BiSN R Y to B. 
• Step 9: Device B uses its SUCB to compute
1( )−=Bi B BiX SUC Y . Then generates a random value 
RB2, computes 2 2( , , , )=B Bi Aj B AH H X X R R  and sends 
HB concatenated with AjY and RB2 to device A.  
• Step 10: Device A uses its SUCA to compute
1( )−=Aj Aj AjX SUC Y  and then computes
( , , , )=A Bi Aj B AH H X X R R . If ≠A BH H ,  A rejects 
and aborts. Otherwise, both units share the same secret 
key = =A BZ H H  and have built a secured VPN 
using Z as a symmetric shared key. (Notice that TA 
cannot disclose Z). 
The protocol in Fig. 6 is a long generic basic proposal which 
may not be an optimum solution. Many optimized versions in 
reduced form may be derived from this version depending on 
the side conditions and operational scenarios. 
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Fig.  6. Mutually joint user-device authenticated D2D communication protocol 
 
B. Updating Consumed CRPs 
In [11], an efficient CRP management is presented. TA 
shares for instance with a device B/user B a seed SB such that 
= +Bi BX S i . The value i is stored in a memory of size t bits 
to manage used pairs by B. When the t-bit memory is fully 
marked (that is all t-CRP entries are consumed) then a new 
CRP list should be created. To update the CRP list after being 
consumed, an update protocol is required. 
Referring to Fig. 7, suppose that mobile B consumes all the t-
CRPs (as one-time tickets) where the last one is /BL BLX Y . 
First, TA generates a new random seed 'BS  with a random 
number TR . Then, encrypts 
'
BS concatenated with TR  as 
'( )
BLX B T
E S R  and sends '( )
BLX B T T
E S R R  to device B. 
Device B computes ' ' 1 '( ( ))−=
BL BLB T X X B T
S R E E S R  and checks 
if ' =T TR R . If not true, process is aborted. Otherwise, device 
B uses its SUCB to generate the new set '( )= +Bi B BY SUC S i  
for all 0 1≤ ≤ −i t . Device B generates a random number RB 
and encrypts all BiY entries with RB using the key BLX  as 
0 ( 1)( ,..., ,..., )BLX B Bi B t BE Y Y Y R− to be sent to TA  with RB. TA 
decrypts the received message to disclose the new CRP and 
'
BR . If 
'
=B BR R , the CRP is updated in B’s records UIRB. 
'Generate random  and B TS R
'( )
BLX B T T
E S R R ' ' 1 '( ( ))
BL BLB T X X B T
S R E E S R−=
'if  then reject
else continue
T TR R≠
'
for {0,1,..., 1}
( ) Bi B B
i t
Y SUC S i
∈ −
= +
Generate random BR0 ( 1)
( ,..., ,..., )
BLX B Bi B t B B
E Y Y Y R R
−
1 '
0 ( 1)( ( ,..., ,..., ))BL BLX X B Bi B t B BE E Y Y Y R R
−
−
→
'if  then reject,    else update device B pairsB BR R≠
Trusted Authority Device B: BSN
Fig.  7.  CRPs update protocol 
C. Security Analysis 
The security analysis addresses two types of attacks: 
impersonation attack and spoofing attack. In the 
impersonation attack, an adversary impersonates identities of 
one or more legitimate parties such as users and mobiles. To 
counteract such attacks, SUC is used to provide unique clone-
resistant identities for each mobile device and the biometric 
identity is involved to identify users. An adversary attempting 
to impersonate the mobile should clone the corresponding 
SUC and hence being able to possess the identity of a 
legitimate device. Since SUC is mathematically clone-
resistant (i.e. the attack complexity is greater than 280) and 
very difficult to clone physically, this type of attack is not 
possible. Note also that a CRP is used only once. So, even if 
an adversary was able to get a CRP it will be useless. 
Moreover, biometric identity protects against fake users since 
only the genuine user can have the same behavior with higher 
probability. More detailed security analysis is in progress and 
is out of the scope of this condensed work description. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
5G is expected to support direct device to device (D2D) 
communication. This would improve the network 
performance and open new security gaps and backdoors. The 
paper proposes a strong authentication method based on 
combining user’s biometric keys with a clone-resistant 
devices identity. The user’s biometric key is identified by 
means of machine learning technique exploiting user’s 
keystroke dynamics together with accelerometer biometrics 
as user identification profiles. Experimental results showed 
attained biometric identification accuracies approaching 96% 
when deploying Naïve Bayes classifier. The used mobile 
device clone-resistant identity is based on a new highly-stable 
and practical digital clone resistant identity. By combining 
both identification technologies, D2D mutual authentication 
would allow solid 5G devices to build private links which 
cannot be intercepted even by the trusted authority, operator 
or manufacturer. Moreover, fake users cannot abuse the 
system as the biometric key is protecting the user’s identity. 
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